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INTRODUCTION
Whether a multinational company is in search of new opportunities to manufacture abroad, or it faces a rationalization and restructuring of its plant network, some of the key decisions that have to be made are of the same nature. In both cases a manufacturing strategy plan is needed which focuses on the plant configuration. This plan should answer questions such as "How many plants should our company ideally have?", "Where should these plants be located?", "What level of competence should each plant have?", "Which strategic role should be attributed to each plant?", "Which products should be produced in which plant?".
Few models are available in the manufacturing strategy literature that help managers to find the answers to these questions. Interesting is the model developed by Kasra Ferdows, which describes and discusses distinct strategic roles of plants. (Ferdows, 1989 ) However, this model lacks empirical testing beyond case research. It is the purpose of this paper to develop an operationalization tool for this model, and to test it empirically on a sample of plants.
INTERNATIONAL MANUFACTURING STRATEGY
Already in 1964 Skinner, a pioneer in the field of manufacturing strategy, warned "the time has come when we must begin to sharpen the management of international manufacturing operations". (Skinner, 1964) As competition is globalizing and the complexity of the environment in which companies operate is increasing, managing an integrated international network has become an increasingly important task for manufacturing managers. (Ferdows, 1997a, Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989 ) Decisions need to be taken of both structural and infrastructural nature. (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984) The size and location of the plants, the capacity, the type of equipment and degree of automation are just a few of the structural decisions that need to be taken for each of the plants. The skill level of the workforce, the degree of autonomy of the plants, and the organization structure of the plants are important infrastructural decisions. (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984) However, a major challenge for multinationals is to leverage the international configuration of manufacturing units for creating sustainable competitive advantage. (Ferdows, 1997a) This requires a holistic perspective on the international plant network.
Despite the importance attached to it by both academics and practitioners, the field of international operations management is still at a relatively early stage of theory development (Roth et al., 1997 ) and could be enriched by insights from empirical research. (Chakravarty et al., 1997) In contrast, there is a broad literature on international business, explaining basically why multinationals exist. See for example (Dunning, 1993) . There is also a rich literature on international strategy focusing on the structure and organization of multinationals. Examples are Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) or Prahalad and Doz (1987) . The models and frameworks developed in these fields of research are very helpful for manufacturing strategy research focusing on international operations. Among the recent work that attempts to build this link between manufacturing strategy concepts and insights from international strategy and international business, we find Ferdows (1989 Ferdows ( , 1997b , Flaherty (1986 Flaherty ( , 1996 , De Toni (1992), Shi (1995) , DuBois (1993) , Meijboom and Vos (1997) , Khurana and Talbot (1999) .
Over the past decade, a new paradigm has emerged in the field of international strategy that builds on the idea that the multinational company has to adopt a structure and an organization that allows the company to respond to conflicting demands by its environment. (Prahalad and Doz, 1987, Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989) The new paradigm pays a lot of attention to the individual manager, which was less the case in the traditional MNE studies. The interaction and communication between managers, the power and skill level of managers, the importance of learning and of sharing know-how are therefore concepts that have received attention in recent research. An important element of this new paradigm is its network approach to the study of the activities of the multinational. (Dunning, 1993) As a consequence, research on the structure and organization of the multinational company has shifted from a focus on the one-to-one headquarters-subsidiaries relationships towards the problem of managing a network of foreign subsidiaries. (Kogut, 1989 ).
The trend towards depicting the multinational as a network of different units can also be observed in the manufacturing strategy literature. Flaherty for example reports how some US companies have evolved from a manufacturing configuration of plants, located in different countries, that were managed fairly independently of each other, towards a coordinated manufacturing network that allowed to benefit from the synergy among the plants. (Flaherty, 1986) She argues that the coordination of international operations in networks can improve cost and delivery performance, and enhances the learning from the experiences of partners in the network. (Flaherty, 1996) The idea of the international manufacturing network is also present in the work of Ferdows, who introduced the concept of the "lead plant", a plant contributing to the company's strategy by developing manufacturing capabilities and sharing these capabilities with other plants in the network. (Ferdows, 1989) 
THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF SUBSIDIARIES AND PLANTS
The international strategy literature provides several taxonomies describing the strategic role of subsidiaries in multinationals. Bartlett and Ghoshal propose a model that distinguishes between four generic strategic roles of subsidiaries of the MNE: the implementer, the black hole, the contributor and the strategic leader. (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989, p101-103) . The generic roles differ on two dimensions: the competence present in the subsidiary (in technology, production, marketing, or another area), and the importance to the company's global strategy of the national environment in which the subsidiary operates. The strategic role of the subsidiary with a global mandate as discussed by Roth and Morrison (1992) can to some extent be compared to the strategic leader. Somewhat different is the model proposed by Jarillo and Martinez. (Jarillo and Martinez, 1990) The first dimension, which they have labeled "the degree of localization", describes the extent to which activities such as R&D, purchasing, manufacturing and marketing are performed in the subsidiary's country. This dimension is thus comparable to the competence dimension studied by Bartlett and Ghoshal. The models differ however on the second dimension. Whereas in the Bartlett and Ghoshal classification the second dimension is externally oriented, in the Jarillo and Martinez classification it is internally oriented. That is, they distinguish on the basis of the degree of integration. This dimension ranges from very autonomous to highly integrated with headquarters. On the basis of these two dimensions, Jarillo and Martinez identify receptive, active and autonomous subsidiaries. Recent research has added a fourth type of subsidiary to this classification, namely the quiescent subsidiary. (Taggart, 1998) These models provide rich insights into the distinct strategic roles subsidiaries may play in the multinational. However, by taking the subsidiary as the unit of analysis, these models encompass the entire value chain. Since the focus of our research is limited to manufacturing, a model describing the strategic role of the manufacturing units, the plants, is more appropriate. Ferdows' model can be regarded as such a translation of the strategic classifications of subsidiaries into a manufacturing classification of plants. (Ferdows, 1989) His model compares to the Bartlett and Ghoshal model in the sense that it distinguishes plants on the basis of the level of competence in the plant and the location advantage, which is an element of the environment in which the plant operates.
Ferdows defines location advantage as "the strategic reason for establishing and exploiting the plant.
He identifies three classes:
1. Access to low cost production input factors Exploitation of low cost labor is the most important reason in this respect, followed by the proximity to cheap raw materials and cheap energy. The fourth production input factor, capital, is -according to Ferdows -only of minor importance in the decision to locate manufacturing abroad.
Proximity to market
The exploitation of a plant in a foreign nation allows more rapid and more reliable product delivery, and facilitates the customization of the product according to customer requirements.
Reducing financial and trade risks, and avoiding trade barriers are -according to Ferdows - other reasons that can be classified as "market-driven".
Use of local technological resources
Proximity to universities, research centers, or sophisticated suppliers, customers and competitors, allows the company to tap into local technological know-how.
In his recent publications, Ferdows extends this category, by adding access to skilled employees. (Ferdows, 1993 , Ferdows, 1997b In other words, technological resources are not only defined as being available from outside sources, such as research institutes or partners in the supply chain. Ferdows recognizes here that the skills and capabilities of the employees are an important source of technological transfer in the manufacturing network.
Ferdows mentions two more reasons for exploiting a plant abroad (the control and amortization of technological assets, and pre-emption of competition), but he reports that these factors are less prevalent than the first three factors, and therefore he does not take them into account in his model. The plant's competence is the second dimension in Ferdows' model. In his earlier work this dimension was described as the extent of technical activities carried out at the site (Ferdows, 1989) . In his more recent work it is defined as the extent to which the following competencies are present in the plant: production, process technical maintenance, procurement, local logistics, production planning, product and process development and improvement, development of suppliers, the supply of global markets, and a global hub role for product and process knowledge. (Ferdows, 1997b) The model is shown in Figure 1 . Ferdows has identified six types of plants, which he labeled the "offshore", "source", "server", "contributor", "outpost" and "lead" plant. We refer to Ferdows (1989) for a discussion of these types of plants. The outpost factory, which has as its primary role to collect information, is probably -according to Ferdows -only a theoretical possibility. It is indeed unlikely that a plant would be located in an area rich of know-how, would act as a "window" to access this know-how, and would not exploit this know-how for its own and other plants' benefit. Figure 1 Ferdows makes interesting assertions on the evolution in strategic role that can or should be expected.
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Often -according to Ferdows -plants abroad start as off-shore plants or servers. But over the years, if these plants stay in their original (low level) role, which implies that there will be relatively little local competence, the plant may fall behind in productivity as there are few manufacturing managers capable of maintaining a high rate of improvement. Secondly, those plants contribute very little to the company as a whole, or otherwise stated, the company as a whole might be missing an opportunity to benefit from local expertise and market know-how. And thirdly, by treating the plant merely as a supplier of products, the company certainly does not create a challenging environment for the local management team. In the long run, this may de-motivate the local managers, and at the same time make it more difficult to convince talented people to join the plant. This places the plant in a vulnerable position.
These observations explain why it is desirable for a company to invest in its plants' competence, in order to allow the plants to fulfill a more substantial strategic role. But even without an explicit topdown decision to develop local competence, some plants seem to follow a natural way upwards in the model. The pressure to reduce time-to-market or to increase customer service for example may stimulate local management to develop the local competence base. Similarly, one may argue that managers will spontaneously seek for the control of a growing amount of competencies and assets, as this improves their status and prestige within the company, and at the same time reduces the vulnerability of the plant. On the other hand, some concerns can be formulated on this model. The location advantages are a selection of three categories, out of the five expressed by Ferdows. The selection of the categories has not been empirically verified, except for some descriptive cases. Moreover, the aspect of "control over technological assets" is of another dimension than the other factors mentioned. Whereas the other factors may indeed be the primary driver to establish a foreign plant, the desire to control technological assets rather determines the choice between partnership or ownership, which is a decision that is subordinate to the decision to go abroad.
A second concern deals with the vertical axis of Ferdows' model. As we have described Ferdows has provided two slightly different definitions of this dimension, namely the extent to which technical activities are performed in the plant, and the presence of competencies in the plant. In his description of the six roles, Ferdows uses a construct that expresses the importance of the plant for the company's strategy: The roles evolve from "just supplying products", over "being a focal point for the company", to "a plant that other plants depend upon". This implicit construct is -in our opinion-a more direct expression of the strategic role of the plant. An empirical test of the model requires a clear definition and operationalization of this dimension.
A related concern is that the model suggests that there is some hierarchy or rank order in the competencies in a plant. However, in reality, it is possible for example to give a certain plant the responsibility for product development without decentralizing procurement or logistics.
In what follows we propose a slightly modified model that deals with the above concerns, and we suggest a way to operationalize the model.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research reported in this paper is part of a larger research study on the international plant configuration of multinational companies. Since the purpose of the research was to understand the "how" and "why" of the international plant network, case study research has been preferred over other research methodologies. (Yin, 1984) Great care has been taken to avoid the pitfalls of case research. A common argument against the use of case research stems from the misconception that case research would be based on qualitative data only, and would therefore lack precision and rigor. However, several methodological papers and books are available that help the researcher to design a rigorous, precise and objective research instrument. Examples are Eisenhardt (1989) , Miles (1994) and Yin (1984) . To the extent possible and where appropriate, these methodological guidelines have been followed in our research. Without being exhaustive, we mention that a strict research protocol has been designed, a questionnaire with both closed and open ended questions has been developed as guidance for the interviews, and both qualitative and quantitative data have been collected in a rigorous and structured way and have been analyzed in a systematic way. It is also important to note that in order to enhance construct validity multiple raters have been used. This tactic is still fairly uncommon in manufacturing strategy research; Speier and Swink have highlighted this as one of the shortcomings in current operations management research. They argue that research based on a single respondent may be subject to the "lone wolf syndrome", the risk that this single respondent has a biased view on the organization unit being studied, or has limited access to information. (Speier and Swink, 1995, Boyer and Verma, 1996) The reliability of the data obtained from the multiple raters can be assessed through the "Intra-Class Correlation" or ICC method. The ICC index measures the variance of the scores of the raters within a plant or company, relative to the between-plant or between-company variance.
The case research has been carried out in eight manufacturing companies headquartered in Western Europe, in different industries: food products (2 companies), textile goods, plastic products, leather products, primary metal, fabricated metal and electrical goods. The companies had between 4 and 10 manufacturing plants. The primary selection criterion for the cases has been diversity, at the level of the company as well as the plant. At the company level it is important to have diversity in terms of the international environment in which the company operates, since one of the research objectives was to explore the link between the characteristics of the company's international environment and the plant configuration in the company. That is, the cases had to be distributed over the global, transnational and multinational environments, as described by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) . Diversity at the plant level has been obtained by selecting companies with a minimum of 4 plants, spread over a broad geographical region. The rationale being that with three plants or less, companies have few opportunities for differentiating the role and focus of their plants. A geographical spread of the plants (Pan-European, or even global) was expected to result in a broad range of drivers for establishing the plant, and therefore also in a broad range of plant roles.
Secondly, the sample was limited to companies with their headquarters in Western Europe, to avoid major cultural differences between the distinct cases.
Data has been gathered at two levels of analysis: the plant and the company.
− Interviews have been conducted with the general manager and with manufacturing managers at headquarters. In total data has been collected on 59 manufacturing plants, through 37 interviews (with a total duration of appr. 120 hours). The number of interviews varied between 2 and 6 per case. A highly structured questionnaire with closed and open-ended questions has been used as a guide through the interviews. The purpose of these interviews has been to measure the strategic role of each of the plants as well as its evolution, as the managers in headquarters perceive it.
− A (different) questionnaire has been sent to the plant managers and/or the manufacturing managers in the distinct production plants. The purpose of these questionnaires has been to measure the strategic role of the plant as well as its evolution, as the managers in the plant perceive it. A total of 144 questionnaires have been sent to 54 out of the 59 plants [1] . 83% of the questionnaires have to "a plant that other plants depend upon". We have developed a Likert-scale to measure this construct directly. Descriptions have been attached to the scale, in order to guide the choice of a score for the plants. These descriptions were extracted from the typology description that was given by Ferdows.
They are listed in Table I . It is important to note that the strategic role, defined in this way, is a matter of degree, rather than a typology. We will therefore, in our empirical discussion, analyze the level of strategic role played by the plant, rather than the type of strategic role. Table I We have asked managers at headquarters, during the in-depth interviews, to rate all plants on a 1-to-9 scale. The current strategic role of the plants at the moment of the interview has been measured (variable "ROLE today"), as well as the level of strategic role of the plant five years before (variable "ROLE -5y") and the expected level five years ahead (variable "ROLE +5y"). The same question has been asked to plant management for their particular plant, through a mail questionnaire. The questionnaire item is reproduced in APPENDIX 1. The level of strategic role of the plant has been determined as the average score that has been given for that plant by the respondents.
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Since this data is highly perceptual tests have been carried out to guarantee the construct validity of the measure. As explained earlier, Ferdows suggested to use the number of people in technical activities as a proxy for the level of strategic role played by the plant. Comparing the level of strategic role with the number of people in the manufacturing staff in the plant could therefore provide an estimate of the construct validity of our measure. The Pearson correlation between our measure of the strategic role as perceived in headquarters and the number of manufacturing staff [2] people in the plant is 0,55.
Comparing to the level of strategic role as perceived by the plant managers gives an R² of 0,40 (both significantly different from 0 at p<5%) The correlation is indeed fairly high, thus strengthening our confidence in the measures.
Although we don't expect a perfect fit between the perception of the strategic role by the headquarters and the plant managers, there should be some correspondence. The correlation between these 2 measures was 0,62 (significantly different from 0 at p<5%).
The reliability of the measure is evaluated through the ICC-index. Table II shows Among these authors we find Schmenner (1979 Schmenner ( , 1982 , Dunning (1993) , Haigh (1990) , and
MacCormack et al (1994).
We should note that there is no uniform definition of these stages. Also, the stages are not always strictly sequential. Yet, the following set of stages seems to emerge:
− First, there is the decision to produce abroad. This is a strategic decision that may be triggered by the observation that a capacity expansion is necessary, that labor cost advantages may be gained by producing in foreign countries, or that market opportunities are present. (Schmenner, 1979 , Haigh, 1990 , Ernst & Young, 1992) The major question that needs to be answered by top management is how the foreign plant will fit in the existing plant network, and how the plant will contribute to the company's strategy.
− The next decision concerns the region or country in which the new facility will be located. Tools are available that are helpful in screening different countries or areas. An example of such a tool is provided in Leontiades (1985) Often this decision is linked to the first decision. The focus of our research has been primarily on the decision to establish (or acquire) a production unit, rather than the criteria for country or site selection. We have composed a list of potential drivers for the establishment of a plant on the basis of some theoretical and empirical publications of location studies, most of which have in turn been based on extensive literature reviews. (Badri et al., 1995 , Artikis, 1991 , Dunning, 1993 , Ferdows, 1993 , Porter, 1990 We also allowed the interviewees to add items to the list if they thought some important drivers were missing. The resulting list is provided in APPENDIX 2. The drivers have been grouped into 9 categories, according to their theoretical coherence. The interviewees were asked to select a maximum of three drivers explaining the initial reason for establishing/acquiring the plant, as well as a maximum of three major advantages the plant's location provides today.
Subsequently, for each of the plants, a summary was made of all the drivers that had been mentioned by the interviewees. We then went back to one of our interviewees in each of the cases, and asked him to select the primary driver among the drivers that had been mentioned by himself and his colleagues.
This procedure of asking multiple respondents to indicate the three main drivers, summarizing the responses, and discussing the results with one of the respondents, has ensured the reliability of the measure. Table III shows the number of times each of the drivers has been ranked as the most important driver for establishing the plant initially, and for exploiting the plant today. Table III It is clear from Table III Secondly, it suggests that, although there is a diversity of reasons for establishing/acquiring a plant, some of these reasons tend to fade over time. This becomes clear when we group the drivers mentioned in Table III into the theoretical categories. The evolution between the initial primary driver and today's primary driver is shown in Figure 2 .
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Take in Figure 2 The figure shows that market proximity is by far the most stable location driver. Almost all the plants that have been established in order to be close to a market, still have their market proximity as their main advantage.
Labor and skills appear to be less stable location drivers. For some plants (6 out of 11), it is still the major advantage, but other plants seem to have found other advantages that replaced the labor advantage.
The socio-political drivers appear to be highly unstable. None of the plants in our sample that have 
THE MODEL OF FERDOWS: EMPIRICAL VERIFICATION
We can now compare the conceptual model developed by Figure 3 
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Conclusion 1
Ferdows recognized that there is diversity in the drivers for establishing and exploiting a plant; he distinguished five categories of drivers. However, he claimed that the three categories represented in his model (low-cost production factors, skills & technological know-how and market proximity)
encompass the vast majority of plants. (Ferdows, 1989 ) This is confirmed in our research. Table III shows that we observed no plants for which today's primary advantage of exploiting it fell outside these three categories. Moreover, Ferdows claims that among the low-cost production factors labor is the most important factor. This is confirmed in our research.
Conclusion 2
We did, however, observe four plants for which the respondents failed to identify a clear advantage of exploiting them. The only reason why these plants are still exploited is the cost (the financial and social cost) of closing the plant.
Conclusion 3
Ferdows' model implies that the degree of contribution of the plant to the company's network differs according to the primary reason for exploiting the plant. It is suggested graphically that plants with low-cost production as the primary driver tend to play a lower level strategic role than plants with market proximity as the primary driver. If we exclude the theoretical outpost factories from the chart, we see that there is also the implicit suggestion that plants with skills and know-how as the primary driver play a higher level strategic role than plants with market proximity as the primary driver. (See Figure 1) The median and mean level of strategic role follows indeed the hypothesized pattern (See Table IV) .
Take in Table IV
The non-parametric Mann-Whitney U Test shows that the plants which have market proximity or access to skills and know-how as the primary driver for their exploitation do indeed have in general a significantly higher level strategic role than plants which have low-cost labor as the primary driver (p<5%). The difference in strategic role between plants with skills and know-how as primary driver, and plants with market proximity as primary driver is not significant. The four plants for which no clear location advantage could be identified have a strategic role that is significantly lower than the role of plants which have a market (p<10%) or skills and know-how advantage (p<5%).
Conclusion 4
Closely related to this is the hypothesis that there are no plants in the upper left and right hand corner of Our data contradicts this hypothesis. One of the plants with a high-level strategic role falls in the labor category for its primary driver. Twelve plants have a high level strategic role and have market proximity as the primary driver. We conclude that there is evidence of plants which do not have skills or know-how as their primary driver, and yet are regarded as centers of excellence that play a strategically important role in the company's plant configuration.
Conclusion 5
The hypothesis of an upward evolution of plants in the framework is supported by the data. The (nonparametric) Wilcoxon Matched Pairs Test indicates that there has indeed been a significant increase in the median strategic role in the five years prior to the research study (significance level p <1%).
However, the increase was not expected to continue in the 5 years following the research study.
We should note that this test reflects the evolution in strategic role only for the subsample of plants that had been part of the network for at least five years (N=49). We will refer to this group of plants as the "senior plants". Comparing these "senior plants" to the "newcomers", the plants that had joined the company recently (that is, in the five years prior to the study) adds extra insights. The average level of strategic role of these "newcomers" is 2,83 which is lower than the average level of strategic role of the "senior plants" (avg. strategic role 4,97). The (non-parametric) Mann-Whitney U Test comparing these two independent groups of plants indicates that the difference in strategic role between the "seniors"
and the "newcomers" is significant at the 5% level.
We conclude from the statistical analyses that the plants that have been with the company for at least five years have experienced, on average, a moderate but significant increase in strategic role.
Newcomers have a low level of strategic role, compared to the "seniors" in the plant configurations.
Conclusion 6
Ferdows describes that some plants combine two or more roles. (Ferdows, 1997b) He gives the example of a plant that is a server for a specific region, and at the same time an offshore supplier of specific components. Although our data has not been designed to test this statement, it provides some evidence for such "secondary roles". For 53 of the 59 plants, more than one location driver was mentioned as being important. Up to eight drivers have been mentioned for one plant.
Conclusion 7
Figure 4 contrasts the perception of the managers at headquarters with the perception of the managers in the plants, by comparing the level of strategic role of the plants as measured in the interviews at headquarters, with the level of strategic role reported in the plant questionnaires. We recall here that plant perception data stems from the 120 questionnaires returned from 50 plants. Figure 4 Some observations can be made from We conclude that the overall picture that emerges from Figure 4 is thus a picture of "modesty" of plant management. Very few managers overestimate the level of strategic role played by their plant. Rather, many underestimate the level of strategic role played by the plant. Especially those whose performance exceeds (more than for the average plant) the cost/quality target set for them still have a modest perception of the level of strategic role they play in the company.
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
As mentioned in the Methodology section, this paper is based on case research. While one of the major advantages of case research is the depth of the information that can be collected, its major disadvantage is the limitation in external validity. The extent to which the conclusions can be generalized may be questioned. However, we are convinced that the careful selection of the cases from a diversity of industries improves the external validity of the work.
As explained earlier, the cases have been limited to companies headquartered in Western Europe, to avoid cultural differences between the cases. Whether the conclusions still hold in multinationals headquartered in other continents is unexplored, and can be subject to future research.
Our research describes the strategic role played by plants in international plant networks. It identifies those plants that develop know-how and capabilities, and transfer this know-how to the other plants in the network. The research doesn't explain how this know-how is developed, nor does it describe the mechanisms used for the diffusion of this know-how and their effectiveness. This is also an area of future research. we expect to find a more balanced situation with various units having a higher level strategic role, i.e.
contributors and lead plants. However, companies within the same sector may follow a different strategy. For instance Toys 'R' Us, which is a distribution company as is Wal-Mart, is much more sensitive to local needs. Therefore we expect a higher level strategic role of the units at Toys 'R' Us than for instance at Wal-Mart Operating units at Toys 'R' Us are definitely at a higher position in the model than the server plants.
Moreover, by splitting front office and back office activities, companies find opportunities for improving productivity by locating the back office in low-cost labor countries, thus adding off-shore units to their network. In some case, the technological evolution reduces the need for market proximity, even for the front office. The location of call centers in low-cost labor countries illustrates this point.
However, this anecdotal evidence linking service companies to Ferdows' model should be subject to further research.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have discussed the international manufacturing model proposed by Ferdows. The paper suggests a tool for operationalizing the model, and tests the model empirically on a sample of plants spread globally. We conclude that the empirical data supports Ferdows' model in most of its elements. However, the typology appears to be too limited to encompass the strategic role that was initially, that is at the moment of establishing or acquiring the plant, played by the plant. This suggests that, although the model provides a useful tool for describing and assessing the strategic role played by the plants in today's manufacturing networks, it doesn't provide enough variety to describe the plants that may be added to the network.
Another remarkable difference between the model and the empirical data is the presence of centers of excellence with market proximity, rather than the proximity of skills or know-how as their primary advantage. Table I Description of distinct levels of strategic role low level strategic role 1 The main goal of the plant is "to get the products produced".
Managerial investment in the plant is focused on running the plant efficiently.
3
The plant has sufficient internal capabilities to develop and improve its own components, products and production processes 5
The plant is a focal point in the company for the development of specific important components, products or production processes 7
The plant develops and contributes know-how for the company high level strategic role 9 The plant is a "center of excellence", and serves as a partner of headquarters in building strategic capabilities in the manufacturing function 
APPENDIX 1 Level of strategic role
Questionnaire item for interviews in headquarters
Typically, the plants in a company may have different roles. Some plants, for example, have a clear focus on the production function only; other plants may be the development and production center for specific product groups or components, or may be the specialized plant for specific processes; other plants have become a partner of headquarters for certain manufacturing capabilities that are important for the whole company.
This "role" of the plants is described below on a 1 to 9 scale. 
